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Abstract  
 
In this paper I look at two court cases that considered the admissibility of 
out of court statements or direct testimony made by people using facilitated 
communication. Matter of M.Z. et al (1992) dealt explicitly with the admissibility of 
testimony made by a ten-year old girl using facilitated communication, in which 
she alleged sexual abuse by a family member. Hahn v. Linn County (2002) was 
about the refusal of a county to pay an agency for provision of facilitated 
communication. Minow’s (1990) three approaches to legal analysis (abnormal-
persons; rights-analysis; and social-relations approaches) provided a useful 
framework for interrogating the two decisions. While using Minow’s framework to 
examine the two decisions, I consider the possible implications of discourses of 
disability and disability research for participation in the legal setting. Which 
regimes of truth are established and re-established in this setting? Lastly, I make 
some suggestions about how the courts might embrace Minow’s social relations 
approach in more obvious ways. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper I look at two court cases that considered the admissibility of 
out of court statements or direct testimony made by people using facilitated 
communication (part of a larger examination of six cases; Morton, 2006a, 2006b). 
Both cases reported in this study were, directly or indirectly, resulting from 
reports of allegations of abuse. Matter of M.Z. et al dealt explicitly with the 
admissibility of testimony made by a ten-year old girl using facilitated 
communication, in which she alleged sexual abuse by a family member. Hahn v. 
Linn County was about the refusal of a county to pay an agency for provision of 
facilitated communication. One of the reasons presented for not paying for, or 
providing, facilitated communication was fear of false allegations of abuse. The 
county had previous experience of a former local police chief accused of abusing 
his son, and this case had been dismissed.  
At first glance, the cases appear quite unalike. Matter of M.Z.  was a 1992 
preliminary hearing in a family court case.  The defense attorney had requested a 
Frye hearing, arguing that the technique of facilitated communication was a novel 
scientific technique. The issue was not about whether the particular child, M.Z.  
could communicate. The issue was whether or not anybody could reliably 
communicate using facilitated communication.  Hahn v. Linn County was a 
disability discrimination case heard in a U.S. District Court in 2002. The judge in 
decided that the pivotal issue was whether or not the plaintiff, Mr Douglas Hahn, 
could communicate using facilitated communication. 
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Legal decisions convey much more than the narrow application of 
precedent. Minow (1990) and Austin (1994) both suggest that decisions and 
analyses can be read for their expression of the worldviews that shape those 
analyses. Minow (1990) and Denno (1997) both present detailed analyses of 
cases, drawing out the worldviews expressed in those cases. Minow (1990) 
ultimately argues for a social-relations approach to legal analysis. Denno (1997) 
similarly makes the case for a more contextualized approach to considerations of 
competence.  
In the rest of this paper I describe Minow’s framework for approaches to 
legal analysis. I then present the arguments and decisions in the two cases. The 
next part applies Minow’s framework to the decisions, and also identifies ways of 
thinking about science and about disability that make these analyses possible 
(i.e. the larger worldviews that underpin the attorneys’ arguments and the judges’ 
decisions). I suggest that Minow’s social relations approach to legal analysis 
offers a way to counter the dominant empiricist discourses of disability research 
in the legal setting. I conclude the paper with some suggestions about how the 
courts might embrace Minow’s social relations approach in more obvious ways. 
2. The framework for analysis 
A product of legal analysis, according to Minow (1990) and to King and 
Piper (1995), is the reduction of complex issues to fit into simplified, pre-existing 
categories for analysis and comparison.  On one level, law can present itself as a 
neutral process, the simple application of precedent.  Yet, Minow (1990) argues, 
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the choice of appropriate pre-existing categories, precedent, is always 
contestable.  
In the United States, litigation is based on the adversary system.  This 
system is founded on the belief that the most effective way to arrive at just 
results in litigation is for each side of a controversy to present the 
evidence that is most favorable to its position and to let a neutral judge or 
jury sift through the conflicting evidence and decide where the truth lies.  
In other words, the truth emerges from a clash of legal adversaries in the 
controlled environment of a courtroom. (Myers, 1992, p. 2, my emphases) 
The attorneys have the task of selecting the relevant traits or aspects of a case, 
in order to identify the relevant case law or precedent that will allow evidence 
“that is most favorable” to their client’s position.  They must successfully and 
aggressively make the argument that the precedent they have distinguished best 
fits the issues at hand.  With Minow (1990), Stubbs (1993) argues that judges 
have and exercise choice in their application of precedent, “delimiting the scope 
of statues and distinguishing and rejecting authorities” (Stubbs, 1993, p. 464). As 
Minow puts it, “The judge then selects the winning side” (1990, p. 2). Once the 
relevant precedent is chosen, the outcomes are often reasonably predictable: the 
judge chooses the winning argument, “accepting the consequences assigned to 
particular legal categories” (Minow, 1990, p. 1). 
Minow’s (1990) description of three approaches to legal analysis provides 
a useful framework for interrogating the two decisions. The abnormal-persons 
approach “treats classifications on the basis of mental incompetence as natural 
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and immutable” (p. 105). Of particular interest is the person’s competence. This 
idea is important to this study because one of the attorneys’ strategies is to 
present their witnesses as competent, and to undermine the competence of the 
witnesses from the other side. Defense attorneys sought to present potential 
disabled witnesses as inherently incompetent. This strategy can be seen as 
located within a wider understanding of autism or of Down syndrome as 
invariably incompetent.  According to Minow (1990), the act of denoting 
difference is a key component of the abnormal-persons approach to legal 
analysis. 
Naming another seems natural and obvious when other professionals, 
social practices, and communal attitudes reinforce that view – and yet 
these sources of confirmation may merely show how widespread and 
deep are the prejudice and mistaken views about the “different” person. 
(Minow, 1990, p. 111) 
The rights-analysis approach “addresses errors in classification and 
invokes the rights of individuals to be free from such errors by governmental 
officials” (p. 105). At first glance, the rights-analysis approach represents an 
advance on the abnormal-persons approach, mainly because it challenges the 
traditional attributions of difference, as those attributions have ‘mistakenly’ denied 
access to rights on the basis of, for example, race, gender, sexuality or religion. 
Within a rights-analysis there are however still some attributions of differences 
that ‘correctly’ deem some individuals to be incompetent.  This approach relies 
on an understanding of progress in disability and special education research 
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being a matter of better diagnosis, intervention and rehabilitation. Minow argues 
that the perception of an advance is illusory. 
Indeed, an examination of contemporary legal theory shows that both the 
traditional theories justifying rights and the major contending theories 
replicate the distinction between normal and abnormal persons, thus 
perpetuating the assumptions that trap us in the difference dilemma. (pp. 
144-145) 
For Minow, the dilemma of difference is an issue that the courts have yet to 
address: 
[W]hen does treating people differently emphasize their differences and 
stigmatize and hinder them on that basis? And when does treating people 
the same become insensitive to their difference and likely to stigmatize or 
hinder them on that basis? (p. 20) 
According to Minow, we would expect that the rights-analysis approach 
would ultimately individualize the approach to be taken, and that it would 
ultimately replicate (reinvoke) the discourses of difference. For example, rather 
than revise fundamental assumptions that it is possible to tell a lot about a 
person’s cognitive abilities by their group membership (race, gender, and so on) 
we just learn to revise our assessments of particular groups of people.  
The social-relations approach is an emerging view that “focuses on how 
classifications reveal relationships of power between those who label and those 
who are labeled” (Minow, 1990, p. 105). Minow suggests that this approach is 
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starting to be adopted because of more recent awareness that mistakes have 
been made in how people have assigned these categories of difference, and the 
implications of those differences. The social-relations approach adopts a critical 
stance towards the assumptions that problems of difference lie within the 
individual, rather than in the relationships between individuals and society. This is 
familiar ground to social constructionists.  Finally, the social-relations approach 
calls into question both the hidden nature of the power of the labelers, and the 
institutional arrangements that preserve that power.  
Minow (1990) described an important set of strategies that could 
contribute to legal treatment of people with disabilities: 
For legal analysis, relational approaches may best be articulated as 
imperatives to engage an observer – a judge, a legislator, or a citizen – in 
the problems of difference: Notice the mutual dependence of people.  
Investigate the constructions of difference in the light of the norms and 
patterns of interpretation and institutional relationships, which make some 
traits matter.  Question the relationship between the observer and the 
observed in order to situate judgments in the perspective of the actual 
judge.  Seek out and consider competing perspectives, especially those of 
people defined as the problem.  Locate theory within context; criticize 
practice in the light of theoretical commitments; and challenge abstract 
theories in light of their practical affects.  Connect the parts and the whole 
of a situation; see how the frame of analysis influences what is assumed 
to be given (p.213).  
Missy Morton, DSE 2009  8 
3. The decisions 
The descriptions of the two court cases that follow draw on material that is 
already in the public domain, maintaining the level of confidentiality that is 
present in the published legal decisions or media reports of the cases. Each 
description will begin with a brief background of the circumstances leading to the 
hearing. I then outline the decision, setting out how the judges communicate their 
accounts of what was relevant. I describe the judges’ presentations of, and 
responses to, the arguments made by the attorneys.  
Matter of M.Z. et al. (September 16, 1992) 
This decision by Judge Minna Buck concerns a preliminary hearing on the 
admissibility of facilitated communication. Prior to this hearing, Micah was ten 
and went to a special school. She was in a class with five other children who 
were also ten years old with disabilities. Her teacher was using facilitated 
communication with Micah, who could speak, albeit with some difficulty. The 
teacher was also using facilitated communication with two other students in the 
class. On returning to school in the spring semester, Micah’s school reported to 
the CPS. Hotline that Micah had made an allegation of sexual abuse against her 
father. While CPS was investigating the allegation, there was a family court order 
made restricting contact. Micah and her younger brother were removed from the 
family home and placed in foster care pending the outcome of the hearing.  
This preliminary hearing, a Frye hearing, was held at the request of the 
defense attorney. The case of Frye v. U.S. was decided in 1923.  The Supreme 
Court was asked to decide whether or not evidence obtained by polygraph (lie 
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detector) should be admissible.  The Supreme Court ruled that such evidence 
was not admissible.  The standard that was applied concerns the general 
acceptance of a scientific technique or theory within the relevant field or scientific 
community.  Since the 1923 decision, Frye hearings have been held on the 
admissibility of expert scientific testimony as related to DNA testing, hypnosis as 
an aid to recall for victims or witnesses, and the use of validation interviews to 
determine the presence or absence of child sexual abuse syndrome or rape 
trauma syndrome as corroborating evidence.  Etlinger (1995, p. 1268) notes that 
the Frye standard of general acceptance requires more than demonstrating that 
the “underlying theory and research technique are scientifically valid.” According 
to Etlinger, a dilemma that courts face when using the Frye standard is that “the 
basis for acceptance in the relevant scientific community is, ironically, not 
necessarily measured by scientific reliability or validity. Consensus in the 
scientific community does not necessarily represent empirical verification” (p. 
1269). 
In a section titled “The nature of the evidence” Judge Buck begins her 
decision with a brief synopsis of facilitated communication.  Judge Buck’s 
description is prefaced with “as described to the court” and “according to its 
practitioners” (p. 565). This background section concludes with a description of 
Micah: “the individual whose ‘facilitated communication’ is at issue in this hearing 
is one of the subject children, a 10-year-old partially verbal child afflicted with 
Down’s syndrome” (p. 565). 
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Considering the arguments 
Her first decision was that the Frye standard was applicable. This section 
of the decision covers the scope of the Frye hearing. Judge Buck sets out four 
issues. First, she considers the applicability of the Frye test. Judge Buck 
determined that Frye was appropriate, even in considering “soft sciences” but 
“with an emphasis on the reliability of the evidence” (p. 566). She then poses and 
answers four “threshold questions”: “What must be accepted, who must accept it, 
how extensive must such acceptance be, and what evidence is acceptable to 
reflect the extent of acceptance?” (p. 566). 
In answering her first question, Judge Buck places facilitated 
communication in the category of a new forensic technique: 
New “forensic technique ... may involve either the new application of a 
well-established theory or the application of a new theory. In the latter 
case, the theory can be validated only empirically or inferentially, not 
deductively ... In terms of the Frye test, if the technique is generally 
accepted, then the theory must be valid although not fully understood or 
explainable.” (Giannelli, 1980, p. 1212, as cited in Matter of M.Z., p. 566) 
In other words, the underlying theory of the technique must be accepted as valid. 
Judge Buck then asks, “Who are the experts whose opinion on facilitated 
communication must be considered?” (p. 567). She noted that who is considered 
an expert depended on which theory of etiology was adopted, acknowledging 
that there was more than one theory. The third finding of the court was that  
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under any theory, the experts whose opinion on facilitated communication 
would be relevant would include psychologists, psychiatrists, speech and 
language pathologists, special education practitioners, and neuro-
scientists (i.e., neurologists, researchers and clinicians in this field). Also 
included would be other clinicians or educators with experience and 
training in evaluating data for purposes of diagnosis, treatment or research 
(e.g., physicians who have diagnosed or treated patients with the aid of 
facilitated communication). (p. 567)  
Judge Buck then went on to explicitly exclude from the list of experts parents who 
have used, or observed the use of, facilitated communication with their children. 
Turning to the issue of how much acceptance was required, Judge Buck 
found that this was a matter of discretion for the court. She noted that “expert 
testimony, scientific literature and court precedents” (p. 567, emphasis added) 
were useful for establishing the degree of acceptance. Scientific literature was 
admissible if it “appeared in a peer-review journal in a relevant field and/or were 
published by acknowledged experts in the field” (p. 567).  
The prosecutor argued that rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
should apply, rather than Frye. Rule 402 states, “All relevant evidence is 
admissible, except as otherwise provided [by rule or statute]” (as cited in Re M.Z. 
p. 571). Judge Buck rejected this argument on the grounds that Frye was still the 
prevailing rule in New York at the time of the hearing. The remainder of the 
decision then addresses the expert testimony, the scientific literature, and court 
precedents. 
Missy Morton, DSE 2009  12 
Only the prosecutor called expert witnesses. The summary of the 
testimony quotes the opinion of a psychiatrist, Dr K., about the possible 
underlying theory for facilitated communication.  
[F]acilitated communication is a means to overcome speech impairments 
in the case of individuals suffering from autism, by allowing them to 
bypass impaired limbic function of the brain; in the case of other 
disabilities, it overcomes “dispraxia” (sic) – a condition described as an 
inability to make the appropriate physical or neurological response to a 
verbal command even though the latter is understood. Dr. K. 
acknowledged, however, that she was not aware of any studies as to 
either of these theories as they related to facilitated communication, and 
that they involved premises about the nature of both autism and Down’s 
syndrome which differed from the current prevailing view as to the etiology 
of those conditions. (p. 573) 
Judge Buck made six points in her summations of the expert witness testimony: 
1. Each of these experts testified, in effect, that there was no prescribed 
method of training facilitators. (p. 574)  
2. Nor are there any requirements imposed by law or practice to certify 
the skill level of facilitators. (p. 574) 
3. Each of the experts acknowledged concern about the possibility of 
manipulation by the facilitator. (p. 575) 
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4. None of these experts were able to refer to any empirical studies 
concerning the validity of the communications or the degree to which 
they were subject to suggestion or interpretation. (p. 575)  
5. There was no research design they were aware of which might 
produce any empirical data. (p. 575)  
6. Each of these witnesses did acknowledge their awareness of others, 
particularly those considered expert in the fields of autism, who either 
disagreed with the assumptions on which facilitated communication is 
based and/or called for more research to test the reliability of the 
technique. (p. 575) 
The expert testimony put forward by the prosecutor is characterized as 
insufficient to make the argument.  
Near the end of her decision, Judge Buck commented  
It should be pointed out that these findings do not constitute any judgment 
on the utility or reliability of facilitated communication … Nor do they imply 
any criticism or demeaning of the motives and conduct of those who have 
been studying and promoting facilitated communication. (p. 579) 
However she is very critical, and dismissive of, the published research. Having 
noted earlier that scientific literature is permitted as evidence if published by an 
acknowledged expert and/or appearing in a peer reviewed journal, she decided 
that the article by Biklen (1990) in the Harvard Educational Review would not be 
allowed as evidence: 
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The petitioners here also offered the article by Dr. Biklen referred to 
above. That article, identified on this record as having appeared in the 
Harvard Education  (sic) Review of August 1990, had been discussed on 
direct and cross-examination of each of the expert witnesses in the instant 
case. It apparently contained a summary of Dr. Biklen’s work to date 
regarding facilitated communication, as well as discussion of his 
experience with facilitated communication or something similar in another 
program in Australia, and a discussion of some of the issues raised by his 
findings. (p. 577-578) 
She added, as an apparent aside “(It should be noted that Dr. K. had previously 
testified that the Harvard Education (sic) Review was not a peer-review journal)” 
(p. 578, parentheses in original). There is however, no description or explanation 
of the process of peer review for any journals, so it is not clear how the HER 
process of peer review is less rigorous than any other process. Finally she 
summarized her comments about the published research by stating “Petitioner 
has presented no scholarly literature about facilitated communication” (p. 578). 
Because Dr Biklen had not appeared as an expert witness, Judge Buck ruled “he 
was not called to establish a foundation for the purpose of receiving the article 
into evidence and, over respondents’ hearsay objection, the court declined to 
receive the article in evidence” (p. 578). 
The prosecution put forward the results of two earlier hearings. The first 
was a due process hearing from a Tennessee Administrative Law Judge (Matter 
of L. v. Public Schools, Dept. of Educ. 90-47, June 27, 1991). The summary of 
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this case includes a description of the research reported in the Harvard 
Educational Review. The judge ruled that L. be placed in a school in Missouri 
that would look at using facilitated communication 
at the School District’s expense in order to “evaluate more fully L’s 
communication abilities, identify the best teaching modalities ... and to 
provide a highly controlled environment in order to obtain an accurate 
assessment of L’s potential.” The order was to remain in effect for six 
months, with the implication that it would thereafter be reviewed. No 
information was provided in the instant proceeding about further 
proceedings or findings in the Tennessee case. (p. 577) 
The decision makes no further reference to Matter of L. v. Public Schools and it 
appears that Judge Buck considers it to have no bearing on the Matter of M.Z. 
The second case the prosecutor put forth was one that Judge Buck had 
herself previously considered:  
Petitioner here also requested the court to take notice of its own rulings 
(N-72/3-90 and N-37/8-91, June 20, 1991) in Matter of Barbara M. and 
Kenneth M., an unrelated article 10 proceeding in which a witness was 
allowed to testify as to statements made by a child outside the courtroom 
using facilitated communication. (p. 577) 
The judge distinguished Matter of Barbara M. and Kenneth M from the present 
case on the grounds that the prior case was dispositional only and was 
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concerned only with the credibility of another witness (i.e. did not involve fact-
finding regarding the truth of the communication).  
Judge Buck decided that the petitioners had not presented sufficient 
evidence to meet the Frye standard. She concluded  
The foregoing findings are limited to a determination that, in the case of 
the use of facilitated communication as described here, there has not 
been sufficient proof of its general acceptance or reliability to permit its 
use in a fact-finding proceeding under article 10 of the Family Court Act. 
(p. 579) 
This decision ignored the published research about facilitated communication 
(e.g. the IDRP Report, 1989; Biklen, 1990; Biklen, Morton, Saha, Duncan et al., 
1991). The Matter of M.Z. does not consider how the court might have used its 
discretion to find means of determining how someone might be able to use 
facilitated communication. The Matter of M.Z. similarly precludes Micah, the 
individual child, from demonstrating whether or not she could use facilitated 
communication without undue influence.   
Hahn v. Linn County (February 2, 2001 and March 11, 2002) 
Douglas Hahn, through and with his two sisters and co-guardians Barbara 
Axline and Judith Barta, claimed that Discovery Living and Linn County were 
denying him access to services.  Hahn v. Linn County (2001) was a motion by 
the defendants, Linn County and Discovery Living, for summary judgment in a 
disability discrimination case in which the [d]efendants raise the following novel 
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question: Whether the defendants’ refusal to provide facilitated communication, 
an alternative form of communication, to an autistic individual violates both 
federal and state disability discrimination laws (p. 1040)? The motion for 
summary judgment was dismissed, and the substantive issue taken up in the 
2002 case.  Chief Judge Mark Bennett, writing for the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Iowa, described Hahn v. Linn County (2002) as a “disability 
discrimination case of first impression” (p. 1052).  
Doug Hahn had lived away from home since he was 12, when he moved 
to Woodward Hospital State Hospital-School in Iowa. He lived there for 30 years. 
In 1987 he moved into a group home run by Discovery Living, a non-profit 
organization contracted by Linn County. There is always at least one Discovery 
Living staff member to supervise Doug and his two housemates. Five days a 
week, from 9:00 to 2:30, Doug goes to Options, which is a sheltered workshop, 
which also contracts with Linn County. At Options he assembles boxes and 
latches.  
The use of facilitated communication in Linn County funded programs was 
short lived. In August 1993, staff at Options and at Discovery Living began using 
facilitated communication with people at the workshop and at his home. Karen 
Kray, a program manager at Options, learned how to facilitate from a speech-
language therapist at a nearby high school. Karen Kray introduced facilitated 
communication to staff and a number of clients, including Doug Hahn. By 
October of that year, Linn County had stopped funding the use of facilitated 
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communication in any of the services it contracted, including both Options and 
Discovery Living. 
Linn County cited two reasons for ceasing funding facilitated 
communication. First, the County said there was a lack of research to validate 
facilitated communication. Second, the County was concerned about “surfacing 
concerns over allegations of sexual abuse by means of facilitated 
communication” (Hahn v. Linn, 2002, p. 1057). While not mentioned in the court 
decision, the local media was also reporting the story of a 1993 allegation of 
sexual abuse made using facilitated communication. In 1993, in an unrelated 
case, a former local Cedar Rapids police commander was accused by his 
disabled son of sexual abuse. The son, who was living in Colorado at the time, 
had used facilitated communication to make the allegation (Kutter, 1999, 2001).  
Linn County spent about a year trying to develop and implement a policy 
that would allow it to continue to use facilitated communication with clients. It 
required that Doug Hahn undertake a literacy test. The County also tried to 
develop a research protocol. In the end, it never resumed funding the use of 
facilitated communication in its services. Doug Hahn’s sister Judith Barta 
continued to use facilitated communication with him, both when he visited them 
at their homes, and when they visited him at his home. The decision notes, 
… neither Linn County nor Discovery Living has banned the use of FC in 
their facilities; the defendants merely refuse to fund FC. Thus, Ms. Barta is 
free to facilitate with Mr. Hahn at both Discovery Living and Options, but 
neither defendant will fund facilitation with the use of its staff. (p. 1058) 
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It was this refusal by Linn County to fund facilitated communication in its services 
that was at the core of the complaint by Doug Hahn and his sisters. 
The plaintiffs, Doug Hahn, Barbara Axline and Judith Barta, thus argued 
that the defendants, Linn County and Discovery Living, were discriminating 
against Doug Hahn. Specifically, by refusing to fund and provide facilitated 
communication, the defendants were “in violation of Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, the Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (ADA), and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA)” (p. 1051). 
Considering the arguments 
Judge Bennett’s first ruling was that “… the court must first determine 
whether Mr. Hahn communicates through facilitated communication because any 
failure on the part of the plaintiffs to carry their burden of proof on this point 
renders unnecessary reaching the other issues” (p. 1058).  Unlike the Matter of 
M.Z., proponents in Hahn v. Linn County argued that the ADA provided guidance 
to the court. A further similarity is that both courts found that it was necessary to 
first make a determination about facilitated communication. Where the Matter of 
M.Z. used the Frye standard to consider the general acceptance of facilitated 
communication, Hahn v. Linn County considered the specific reliability of Doug 
Hahn’s use of facilitated communication.  
Both parties called expert witnesses to testify about the reliability and 
general acceptance of facilitated communication. Judge Bennett described this 
issue as “moot” because the “pivotal issue” was Doug Hahn’s communication (p. 
1060). The plaintiffs also wanted their expert witnesses, Dr Biklen and Dr 
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Kleiwer, to testify about the effectiveness of facilitated communication for Doug 
Hahn in particular, and the defense objected to this testimony, citing Daubert 
(1993). 
The guidelines provided by Daubert are that the  
district court must ‘ensure that an expert’s testimony both rests on a 
reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.’ … That is so 
because, absent some indicia of reliability and relevance to the case 
before the trier of fact, the testimony cannot ‘assist’ the factfinder, as 
required by Rule 702. (p. 1060) 
In their turn, Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702 stipulate that 
 If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) 
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is 
the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
(p1060) 
Ultimately, the court decided that it did not need to decide the applicability of 
either Daubert or Federal Rules of Evidence 702, because the court found “that 
Mr. Hahn’s facilitators, and not Mr. Hahn, author the facilitated communications” 
(p. 1064).  
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Judge Bennett invited Judith Barta to demonstrate facilitated 
communication to the court, either with Doug Hahn or anyone else. All parties 
agreed, and Doug Hahn and Judith Barta met with the judge in his chambers. 
The decision documents the judge’s interpretation of what he saw: 
During this in-court demonstration, Mr. Hahn did not look at the keyboard 
despite Ms. Barta’s prompts. Yet, his responses to Ms. Barta’s typed 
questions were glaringly absent of the kind of typos one would expect 
when typing without looking at the keyboard and without a “home row” of 
keys. The plaintiffs’ experts agree that an individual must look at the 
keyboard before there can be any question that the output is authentic. 
During the demonstration, Mr. Hahn never looked at the keyboard, while 
Ms. Barta’s eyes never strayed from the keyboard. In addition, from the 
demonstration, it was clear that Ms. Barta was guiding Mr. Hahn’s finger 
and not merely providing resistance. Her hand was directly under Mr. 
Hahn’s hand and essentially placed Mr. Hahn’s finger on the key to be 
typed. In combination, Mr. Hahn’s failure to look at the keyboard and Ms. 
Barta’s direction of Mr. Hahn’s finger, compel this court to conclude that 
the output generated by Mr. Hahn was not genuine, i.e., was not Mr. 
Hahn’s. (p. 1062) 
Judge Bennett noted that his decision was limited to the issue of whether 
Doug Hahn could communicate using facilitation. Given that this was not proven 
in court, he ruled that Discovery Living and Linn County were not required to 
“fund an ineffective means of communication” (p. 1064).  The decision also 
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clearly stated that this finding was limited only to Doug Hahn, as “another 
Options or Discovery Living consumer might be one of the few individuals who is 
able to communicate his or her own thoughts through facilitated communication” 
(p. 1064). Nevertheless, because the court determined that facilitated 
communication was not effective for Doug Hahn, the defendants were not in 
violation of the Rehabilitation Act, ADA or the Iowa Civil Rights Act. 
4. Discussion and conclusion  
An important debate in these cases was what would count as research 
into facilitated communication, and who would be considered to have the 
necessary expertise to be able to comment on facilitated communication in 
particular, and disability in general. This debate emerged from the strategic 
manoeuvrings of the attorneys to frame the issues in particular ways. In framing 
the debates, the attorneys were able to invoke discourses of disability and of 
research that were easily recognized by their audiences of judges and other 
attorneys, who were also writers of legal analyses. The written decisions then 
place “on the record” the arguments and the outcomes of these debates. The 
published decisions add to the canon of ‘what is known’ about facilitated 
communication, about disability and how it should be studied. 
The predominant approach has been the abnormal-persons approach to 
legal analysis. This approach both depends upon and supports an expert or 
medical discourse of disability. When a rights-analysis approach was used, the 
rights of the ‘abnormal’ purported victims were pitted against are the ‘normal’ 
accused, which invariably led to a collapse to the abnormal-persons approach to 
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analysis. The social-relations approach to legal analysis seems to offer the most 
cogent challenge to the normal science approach that both underpins and is 
supported by the abnormal-persons approach to legal analysis. 
In the cases described in this paper, the judges (and attorneys) writing 
about the applicability of Frye or Daubert were not explicit that they were also 
writing about themselves (and juries) and their ability to “tell” if someone was 
communicating, their ability to understand and apply disability research to the 
person before them. They were not yet self-consciously writing about their 
relationships with the people who were used as experts to support the work of 
the courts, and their relationships with those they did not recognize as experts. 
They were not yet deliberately writing about their relationships with those they 
presumed to be like them, and about those they presumed to be different from 
themselves. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to dictate the proper form of 
legal analysis, I want to suggest some questions that judges might consider as 
they determine the procedures that will be followed in their courts, the precedents 
that they will apply, their frameworks and perspectives that will shape their 
analyses and decisions. Judges would need to answer these questions for 
themselves, for the other participants in a specific case, and for the wider 
audiences who read the decisions and use these decisions to then guide their 
practices. 
• What do I think we can achieve by setting up the interactions in this setting in 
this way?  
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• Whose voice is heard, whose argument is privileged by setting up the 
interactions in this way? What are the costs, and to whom? 
• When a particular line of argument, or a particular piece of evidence, is 
compelling, why is it compelling? What are (my) assumptions, experiences 
and/or beliefs that make this compelling? 
• What is it about a particular witness that makes her or him more or less 
convincing? What are (my) assumptions, experiences and/or beliefs that 
make this person more or less convincing? What are the shared experiences, 
values and understandings that I might assume we have? What are our 
differences that I might be assuming? What significance do I give to these 
assumed similarities and differences?  
I do not mean to suggest that there will not be tensions as these questions 
are addressed. For example, people who are accused will want to feel that their 
perspective and their situation is well represented, that due process is followed. 
There will be a need to establish the competence and credibility of all witnesses, 
including ensuring that an individual using facilitated communication is in fact 
able to do so in the court setting. The challenge for judges will be to ensure those 
they have seen as most different to themselves are not required to reach 
different, and more restrictive, standards than those who already enjoy privileged 
positions in the legal setting. The challenge for judges will be to ensure that those 
who they have seen as least like themselves are no longer the people most likely 
to be silenced. 
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